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Abstract 
 
Objective: The present study examined the extent to which emotion regulation and distinct 
emotion regulation processes mediate the relationship between attentional bias and sustained 
negative affect in individuals at-risk for depression following a mood induction. Method: To 
assess this question, previously depressed (n = 40) and never depressed control (n = 44) 
participants underwent a sad mood induction and mood reactivity and recovery were measured. 
Sad mood was assessed at four different time points: immediately before and after mood 
induction, and six and 12 minutes after mood induction. Participants completed an exogenous 
cuing task to assess for attentional biases and answered questionnaires related to emotion 
regulation processes and depressive symptomatology. Results: Attentional bias did not 
significantly predict sustained negative affect after the mood induction and therefore 
meditational models could not be constructed. Further, there were no significant differences in 
attentional bias between previously depressed and never depressed individuals. However, 
cognitive reappraisal significantly predicted mood reactivity and mood recovery after 12 
minutes, and executive suppression approached significance in predicting mood recovery after 
six minutes. Previously depressed and never depressed individuals significantly differed in their 
reported use of ruminative brooding and reflection. Conclusions: Results suggest that cognitive 
reappraisal may be particularly important in reducing sustained negative affect in depression and 
suggest there may be merit in examining the effects of emotion regulation strategies beyond the 
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The Role of Emotion Regulation in Attentional Biases in Mood-Congruent Information and 
Sustained Negative Affect in Depression 
Depressive disorders represent the leading cause of disability worldwide and are 
significant contributors to the global burden of disease (World Health Organization, 2012). In 
2012, The World Health Organization estimated that depressive disorders affect 350 million 
people around the world. Suicide, which is often associated with depression and other mental 
illness, represented the tenth leading cause of death in the United States in 2010; an estimated 
105 suicide completions per day occurred in the U.S. in 2010 (Center for Disease Control, 2012). 
Depressive disorders are therefore not only debilitating, but also potentially fatal. Individuals 
with depressive disorders experience disruptions in all domains of functioning. Further, 
occurrence of a major depressive episode is the best predictor of subsequent episodes and 
susceptibility to depression; increasing numbers of depressive episodes are predictors of the 
chronicity and severity of the disorder. Given the devastating impact of depression, it is 
important to evaluate theories of depression and understand the underlying mechanisms of the 
disorder so that efficacious prevention and intervention efforts may be realized.  
Depression is characterized by a constellation of symptoms. To meet criteria for major 
depressive disorder, sad mood or anhedonia must be sustained for at least two weeks, along with 
at least four of the following symptoms: fatigue, concentration difficulties, indecisiveness, 
suicidal ideation, insomnia or hypersomnia, marked weight loss or gain, psychomotor retardation 
or agitation, and/or extreme feelings of guilt or worthlessness (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Although the presentation of depression can be heterogeneous, sustained 
negative affect is a hallmark symptom of depression. Thus, understanding the processes that 
promote and maintain this negative mood state is essential.   
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Cognitive theories of depression posit that negative cognition contributes to and 
perpetuates depression (Beck, 1967). As compared to nonvulnerable individuals, those who are 
currently depressed or vulnerable to depression are thought to possess a depressogenic cognitive 
schema in which a triad of negative core beliefs about the self, the world, and the future are held 
(Beck, 1970). Depressogenic cognitive schemas include themes of loss, failure, worthlessness, 
rejection, and separation (Beck, 1976). Depressogenic cognitive schemas are maintained, 
strengthened, and expanded by recurrent processing of negative information that furthers 
interconnected networks of depressotypic thoughts and images (Bower, 1981; Ingram, 1984).  
Additionally, cognitive theories suggest that depressed individuals have systematic 
emotional information processing and attentional biases that cause them to selectively process 
stimuli congruent with their depressogenic schemas (Beck, 1976). The content specificity 
hypothesis proposes that biases in depression should be directed towards depressotypic 
information with themes of sadness and loss as opposed to other types of valenced information 
(e.g., positive, neutral; Beck, 1976). Thus, those with depression should exhibit biases towards 
schema-congruent information, such as sad faces. This enduring bias to processing schema-
congruent information is theorized to lead to sustained negative affect (Beck, 1967).   
Further, those with susceptibility to depression may exhibit biases towards schema-
congruent information and subsequently experience sustained negative affect. Vulnerability to 
depression has been operationalized by past research as having parental history of depression, a 
previous depressive episode, and/or as experiencing subthreshold levels of depression (Ingram & 
Hamilton, 1999). In vulnerable individuals, depressogenic schemas can be active or latent; when 
latent, schemas become activated by stress, and are thus described as latent but reactive (Segal & 
Shaw, 19886).  Cognitive diathesis-stress models postulate that latent depressogenic schemas are 
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activated by environmental stressors or mood induction in a laboratory setting (see Scher, 
Ingram, & Segal, 2005 for a review). Activation of depressogenic schemas in vulnerable 
individuals activates depressotypic cognitive processes and products, such as attentional biases to 
mood-congruent information and negative automatic thoughts regarding the self (Bistricky, 
Ingram, & Atchley, 2011). Thus, active depressogenic schemas and resulting enduring bias to 
mood congruent information may result in sustained negative affect and perpetuation of 
depression.  
Empirical evidence has provided support for theoretical models of mood-congruent 
biased attention and information processing in depression and dysphoria. Specifically, 
researchers have suggested that depressed and depression-vulnerable individuals exhibit 
preferential attention to and difficulty disengaging from mood congruent information once it has 
entered awareness. In order for mood-congruent information to enter awareness, studies have 
shown that the information must be presented for at least 1000 milliseconds (ms) or one second 
(Bradley, Mogg, & Lee, 1997). Nondepressed individuals, however, do not experience 
difficulties disengaging from negative information; instead, they are more likely to shift attention 
away from negative information. For example, Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, and Joormannn 
(2004) investigated attentional differences to interpersonal information between a clinically 
depressed group, a clinically anxious group, and a control group. Gotlib et al. (2004) found that 
the depressed group exhibited an attentional bias to, and difficulty disengaging from, sad or 
mood-congruent faces once the stimulus was presented for at least one second. The anxious 
group and control group did not exhibit the same biases. Additionally, Koster et al. (2005) 
studied attention to positively valenced, negatively valenced, and neutral words in dysphoric and 
nondysphoric participants. Koster el al. found that dysphoric participants exhibited increased 
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attention to negatively valenced words, while nondysphoric participants maintained attention to 
positive words.  
Attentional biases have also been shown to persist despite recovery from a depressive 
episode. Joormann and Gotlib (2007) found that currently depressed and previously depressed 
participants exhibited biases to sad faces in a dot-probe task; never depressed controls did not 
exhibit this bias and avoided sad faces. In an eye-tracking study, Sears, Newman, Ference, and 
Thomas (2011) found that previously depressed and currently dysphoric participants oriented to 
images with themes of depression more frequently than never depressed controls. Sears et al. 
(2011) also found that previously depressed and dysphoric individuals oriented to positive 
images less frequently than controls. Thus, evidence has shown that depressed, dysphoric, and 
depression-vulnerable individuals have been shown to exhibit preferential attention, or 
attentional bias, to mood-congruent information.  
Researchers have hypothesized that difficulty disengaging from mood-congruent 
information may preclude depressed and depression-vulnerable individuals from restoring 
positive affect. Attentional bias to mood-congruent information may contribute to sustained 
negative affect and therefore the maintenance of depression. Clasen, Wells, Ellis, and Beevers 
(2012) examined the association between attentional bias and persistence of a negative mood 
state following sad mood induction in individuals diagnosed with major depressive disorder and 
never depressed controls. Contrary to previous findings, Clasen et al. (2012) did not find 
differences in attentional bias between currently depressed and never depressed groups as 
ascertained by an exogenous cuing task. However, they found that attentional bias for sad stimuli 
was associated with greater impairments in recovery to baseline mood for the depressed group 
than for the control group. Thus, an association between depression, depression maintenance, 
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and attentional bias towards mood-congruent information has been established; however, 
explanations for this association have not been investigated.  
Theorists have posited that vulnerable and nonvulnerable individuals do not differ in their 
reactivity to a negative event, but in their trajectory of emotional recovery from a negative event 
(Teasdale, 1988). Thus, the difference lies in their ability to restore their emotional baseline. 
Accordingly, researchers have proposed emotion regulation as an explanation for the relationship 
between attentional bias towards mood-congruent information and negative affect in depression 
(Joormann, 2004, 2006; Joormann & D’Avanzato, 2010). Emotion regulation has been 
conceptualized as the conscious or unconscious process of evaluating and modulating emotions 
in response to environmental stimuli at any point in the emotion generative process (Gross, 
1998). Emotion regulation is a cognitive process that modifies the type, intensity, physiological 
experience, and behavioral expression of emotion, as well as when the emotion is expressed. The 
fundamental goal of emotion regulation is to increase positive affect and decrease negative affect 
(Gross, 1998). Several distinct cognitive emotion regulation processes have been identified. At 
the most basic level, these processes are differentiated by when they occur in the process of 
emotion generation (Gross, 2001). Processes are either antecedent-focused or response-focused. 
Antecedent-focused processes are those that occur before the emotional response and subsequent 
behavioral and physiological responses are generated. Response-focused processes are those that 
modulate current emotional responses and their behavioral and physiological correlates. 
One antecedent-focused emotion regulation process is cognitive reappraisal. Cognitive 
reappraisal involves modifying a potentially emotion-eliciting stimulus so that its emotional 
impact will be altered (Gross, 1998). Those who deploy cognitive reappraisal actively attempt to 
reframe negative stimuli and situations and repair bad moods. Consequently, those who employ 
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cognitive reappraisal report increased positive affect and psychological well-being, and 
experience fewer depressive symptoms than those who do not regularly use cognitive reappraisal 
(Gross & John, 2003). Depressed individuals report less frequent use of cognitive reappraisal 
than remitted and never depressed individuals (Joormann & Gotlib, 2010). Cognitive reappraisal 
is therefore considered to be an adaptive emotion regulation process.  
Executive suppression is a response-focused emotion regulation process. Executive 
suppression involves inhibiting the expression and experience of emotion (Gross, 2001). 
Although suppression is effective in reducing short-term emotional expression and experience, it 
is not effective in reducing long-term emotional experience and results in increased physiological 
arousal (Gross, 1998; Gross 2001). Interestingly, when an individual attempts to regulate 
negative emotion by means of suppression, paradoxical increases in negative emotion result 
(Gross, 1998). The use of executive suppression has been found to be associated with various 
forms of psychopathology and is a risk factor for depression (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & 
Schweizer, 2009). Thus, executive suppression is considered to be a maladaptive emotion 
regulation process.  
Another response-focused emotion regulation process is rumination, which is 
characterized by the repetitive recycling of thoughts. Rumination can be further differentiated 
into ruminative brooding and reflection (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoekshema, 2003). 
Ruminative brooding is characterized by repetitive processing and focusing on the causes, 
feelings, and consequences of negative emotions in an effort to problem solve (Aldao et al., 
2009; Treynor et al., 2003). Paradoxically, however, rumination inhibits, rather than promotes, 
problem solving. Further, brooding over depressotypic emotions promotes sustained negative 
affect (Gross, 1998). Rumination is thus considered to be a maladaptive emotion regulation 
   
	   	   	  7 
process. In contrast, reflection is a response-focused process characterized by engaging in 
problem solving (Treynor et al., 2003). Research has found that use of reflection predicts 
remission from a depressive episode and is longitudinally associated with less depression 
(Arditte & Joormann, 2011; Treynor et al., 2003). Thus, reflection is considered to be an 
adaptive emotion regulation process.  
In sum, the goal of emotion regulation is to increase positive emotions and decrease 
negative emotions; however, certain emotion regulation processes increase negative emotions 
and reduce positive emotions. Those processes that increase negative emotions (e.g., suppression 
and brooding) are associated with decreased psychological well-being and psychopathology. 
Indeed, empirical evidence has shown that depressed individuals are more likely to use certain 
processes (brooding, suppression) than others (cognitive reappraisal). Further, maladaptive 
emotional regulation processes are present not only in depressed individuals but also in those 
who have remitted from a depressive episode (Ehring, Fischer, Schünlle, Bösterling, & Tuschen-
Caffier, 2008). Despite this work, surprisingly little research has examined the role of emotion 
regulation in the maintenance of depression. 
Empirical evidence has shown that certain emotion regulation processes are more 
frequently used in depressed individuals than others, suggesting that these processes may help to 
perpetuate negative emotions and subsequent depression. Not surprisingly, researchers have 
posited that emotion regulation may play a key role in the relationship between attentional bias 
to mood-congruent information in depressed and depression-vulnerable individuals; however, to 
our knowledge, no study has investigated the role of emotion regulation in the association of 
attentional bias and maintenance of sustained negative emotionality and depression.  
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In line with these ideas, the goal of the present study was to examine the extent to which 
emotion regulation and distinct emotion regulation processes may mediate the relationship 
between attentional bias and sustained negative affect in individuals at-risk for depression. To 
assess this question, previously depressed and never depressed control participants completed a 
modified version of the Clasen et al. (2012) exogenous cuing task to assess for attentional biases 
and answered questionnaires related to emotion regulation processes and depressive 
symptomatology. In the present study, depression vulnerability was operationalized as history of 
a clinically significant major depressive episode. As per the diathesis-stress model, participants 
underwent a sad mood induction intended to activate latent depressogenic schemas. The 
activation of such schemas should result in the emergence of dysfunctional cognitive processes 
(e.g., attentional bias). Thus, the mood induction was used to elicit depressotypic cognitions in 
the depression-vulnerable and allow for a comparison of attentional bias between groups.  
I expected previously depressed participants to exhibit greater attentional bias towards 
sad information as compared to controls based on cognitive theories of depression and empirical 
support of these theories (e.g., Beck, 1976; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; Ingram, 1984; Sears et al., 
2007). Further, based on Clasen et al.’s (2012) findings, I expected participants who exhibit 
biases towards sad stimuli to have impaired mood recovery, regardless of depression history. 
Regarding emotion regulation, I hypothesized that emotion regulation strategies would mediate 
the relationship between attentional bias and sustained negative affect, such that rumination and 
ruminative brooding would prolong negative affect and reflection, executive suppression, and 
cognitive reappraisal would shorten the duration of negative affect in both groups. Further, I 
anticipated that previously depressed and never depressed participants would differentially use 
some emotional regulation processes based on evidence that maladaptive emotion regulation 
   
	   	   	  9 
strategies persist past remission from depression (Ehring et al., 2008); specifically, I predicted 
group differences in use of executive suppression, overall rumination, and ruminative brooding. 
Finally, I predicted that, regardless of depression history, participants who reported high levels of 




The sample consisted of 84 students from the University of Kansas who participated in 
partial fulfillment of course requirements.  Participants met the following inclusion criteria: (a) 
Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-II) total less than or equal to nine and no previous history of 
depression as ascertained by the self-report version of the major depressive episode module of 
the Structured Clinical Interview for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV-TR (SCID-SR; 
control); or (b) BDI-II total less than or equal to nine and endorsement of a previous, but not 
current, depressive episode within the past three years on the SCID-SR (previously depressed). 
The never depressed control group consisted of 44 participants and the previously depressed 
group consisted of 40 participants. Sample characteristics are presented in Table 1. 
Measures 
 Self-Report Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR Axis I Disorders (SCID-
SR). A modified self-report version of the SCID (First et al., 2002) was used to evaluate the 
presence of a current or past major depressive episode. For the purposes of this study, only the 
major depressive episode (MDE) section of the mood module will be administered in a self-
report form. The SCID-SR was used instead of the SCID-I-NP because undergraduate research 
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assistants ran the majority of participant sessions. Given the amount of training and experience 
necessary to administer the SCID-I-NP, the SCID-SR was best suited for this study.  
 Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II). The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report questionnaire 
developed to assess depression severity (Beck, 1996).  The BDI-II is a widely used measure of 
depression. Participants were asked to respond to each question based on the past two weeks, 
including the day of administration. BDI-II scores may range from 0 to 63, with higher scores 
indicating more symptoms of depression (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The BDI-II has shown 
adequate reliability and validity (Beck, et al., 1996). 
 Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ). The ERQ (Gross & John, 2003) is a 10-
item self-report questionnaire designed to measure trait-level emotion regulation responses to 
positive and negative emotions. Specifically, the ERQ examines cognitive reappraisal (e.g., I 
control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in) and executive 
suppression (e.g., I control my emotions by not expressing them) through two subscales. 
Responses are rated on a 7-point Likert scale, where 1=strongly disagree, 4=neutral, and 
7=strongly agree are item anchors. The ERQ has been shown to be valid and reliable, with good 
internal consistency (α= .77), test-retest reliability (r= .69), and convergent and discriminant 
validity (Gross & John, 2003).  
 Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS). The RRS (Treynor, Gonazales, and Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003) is a 22-item self-report questionnaire that examines rumination. The RRS has 
two subscales for brooding and reflection that were identified through factor analysis. Each 
subscale is comprised of six items. Each item is framed with the prompt, “When you are feeling 
sad, or depressed, how often do you…”. An example item from the brooding scale is …Think 
“What am I doing to deserve this?,” and an example item from the reflection scale is …Analyze 
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recent events to try to understand why you are depressed. Item responses have anchors 1=Almost 
never to 4=Almost always. Adequate internal consistency and test-retest reliability for the RRS 
were established in a large community sample for brooding (α=.77, r=.62) and reflection (α=.72, 
r=.60) subscales (Treynor et al., 2003).  
 Visual Analogue Scale (VAS). The VAS (Luria, 1975) is a 100 millimeter line used to 
assess current mood state, in this case sad mood. Participants were asked to indicate their current 
level of sadness by drawing a mark at the point on the line that correlated with their current level 
of sadness. The line is anchored with extremes of the mood state of interest; with not sad at all at 
0 mm and extremely sad at 100 mm. Scores range from zero to 100, with higher scores denoting 
higher reports of current sadness. Scores are derived by measuring the distance from the least 
extreme anchor, not sad at all, to the point marked by the participant. 
  The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). Both the positive (PA) and 
negative (NA) affect scales of the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellengen, 1988) were used to 
measure mood immediately before and after the mood induction. The PA and NA scales 
represent the degree to which individuals are experiencing positive and negative affect within the 
environment; thus, lower scores on either denote minimal positive or negative emotionality, 
whereas high scores would denote distress on the NA or pleasurable engagement on the PA 
(Watson et al., 1988). The PANAS is a 20-item scale consisting of 10 positive words and 10 
negative words. Participants were asked to rate how much each word described how they were 
currently feeling on a 5-point Likert scale, where 1=not at all and 5=extremely. Positive items 
were summed to create a positive affect (PA) score, and negative items were summed to create a 
negative affect (NA) score. The PANAS has shown adequate reliability and validity on both 
scales, with good internal consistency on the PA (α=0.89) and NA (α=0.85; Crawford & Henry, 
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2004). Crawford and Henry (2004) established normative means for the PA and NA scales based 
on a large clinical sample. The mean for the PA scale is 31.31 (SD = 7.65) and the mean for the 
NA scale is 16.00 (SD = 5.90). Additionally, Crawford and Henry (2004) found that the PA scale 
explained a significant proportion of variance unique to depression versus anxiety, and also 
found that the PA scale explained significantly more of the proportion of variance unique to 
depression than the NA scale. Crawford and Henry (2004) posited that this may be due to the 
negative relationship between anhedonia and high PA. 
Stimuli 
 The exogenous cuing task. The exogenous cuing task (Posner, 1980) was used to 
measure attentional bias and difficulty disengaging from emotional stimuli before, immediately 
after, and twelve minutes after mood induction. The length of reaction time to a probe 
quantitatively assesses attentional bias and difficulty disengaging from emotional stimuli after 
viewing stimuli. These stimuli can be emotional faces or words. Increasing length of reaction 
time corresponds to greater attentional bias and increased difficulty in disengaging from the 
previous stimulus. A modified version of the exogenous cuing task that incorporates emotional 
faces was used (Clasen et al., 2012). Each session incorporated emotional images of happy, sad, 
and neutral faces taken from the set of Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF; Lundqvist, 
Flykt, & Öhman, 1998). Thirty-two faces were selected from each emotional category so that 96 
total faces were shown in each session. Words are traditionally used in the task, but Clasen et al. 
(2012) posited that human faces are more appropriate because facial expressions receive 
processing priority and are widely used in research. Further, processing of human facial affect 
influences emotion regulation, in that human facial expressions communicate and elicit emotions 
(Bistricky, Ingram, & Atchley, 2011; Ruys & Stapel, 2008). Human facial expressions elicit 
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immediate emotion, and because of this, are thought to be more effective in eliciting emotions 
than words (Bistricky, Ingram, & Atchley, 2011; Vanderploeg, Brown, & Marsh, 1987). 
 The modified exogenous cuing trial began with a white fixation cross in the center of the 
screen for 500 ms. A face then appeared in either the left or right side of the visual field for 1500 
ms. When the face disappeared, a probe—an O or a Q—appeared in the same or opposite 
location of the face. Participants were asked to press the computer key corresponding to the 
probe type as quickly and accurately as possible. The probe did not disappear until the 
participant responded. Reaction times (RTs) and accuracy were recorded. After each response, a 
black screen appeared for 500 ms until the next trial began. Probes appearing on the same side of 
the visual field are valid and probes appearing in the opposite side of the visual field are invalid. 
In this task, 50% of the probes were valid and 50% of probes were invalid. Within valid and 
invalid trials, there was a 50% chance of the probe being an O or a Q. The task began with 16 
practice trials using neutral faces; participants had to correctly respond to 80% of the faces 
before proceeding with the task.  
 Mood induction. Participants were provided a CD player that instructed them to recall a 
negative event in their life along with the event’s emotional, physiological, and interpersonal 
correlates. They were instructed to think about this event while they listened to music from the 
“Field of Dreams” soundtrack for approximately eight minutes. This mood induction has been 
successfully used to elicit negative mood in never depressed and previously depressed 
individuals (Ingram & Ritter, 2000). After listening to the soundtrack, participants were asked to 
write about the negative event they had thought about. A positive mood induction of thinking 
and writing about a happy time was presented at the end of the study. Participants were offered 
the opportunity to talk to a clinician and were informed about available treatment services. 
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Procedure 
The duration of each session was approximately 60 minutes; participation was completed 
in one session. Participants who completed a pre-screening questionnaire and had a BDI-II total 
of nine or less were invited to participate in the study. After consent, participants were asked to 
complete the SCID-SR and BDI-II in order to reaffirm eligibility. Responses to the SCID-SR and 
BDI-II were evaluated as soon as these measures were completed. If participants no longer met 
inclusion criteria, they were thanked for their time, awarded appropriate credit, and excused. If 
inclusion criteria were met, the session proceeded as follows. 
Participants were first seated in front of a stimulus computer to complete the exogenous 
cuing task. Instructions for the task appeared on the computer screen. Participants were asked to 
focus on the fixation cross at the center of the screen between trials. They were informed that a 
face would appear on either side of the screen after the fixation cross disappeared. Participants 
were told that either an “O” or a “Q” would appear on either side of the screen after the face 
disappeared. They were asked to press the “O” key if they saw an O and the “Q” key if they saw 
a Q. Participants were instructed to press the O or Q as quickly as possible without making 
mistakes. Participants were instructed to place their middle finger on the computer’s “O” button 
and their index finger on the computer’s “Q” button. The “4” key and the “5” key on the 
computer’s number pad were programed as “O” and “Q,” respectively. After reading the 
instructions, participants performed a practice trial while the researcher was in the room. The 
researcher ensured participant understanding and exited the room while participants completed 
the task. Upon completion of the task, participants completed the ERQ, RRS, and a 
demographics questionnaire.   
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Participants then underwent the sad mood induction. Immediately before and after the sad 
mood induction, participants completed the VAS and PANAS to assess current mood state and 
ensure the mood induction had the intended effect. Participants completed the exogenous cuing 
task again immediately after and 12 minutes after the mood induction. At six and 12 minutes 
after the mood induction, the VAS was administered to assess current level of sadness and track 
mood recovery. Thus, sad mood was assessed at four time benchmarks: immediately before and 
after mood induction, six minutes after mood induction, and 12 minutes after mood induction. 
The exogenous cuing task was administered after the final administration of the VAS. 
After participants completed the final exogenous cuing task, they were debriefed and 
given a positive mood induction to cultivate more positive emotions. They were asked to think 
and write about a happy time in their life. Participants were offered the opportunity to talk to a 
clinician and were informed about available treatment services. At the end of the session, 
participants were thanked and awarded commensurate credit.   
Results 
Mood Induction 
 A repeated measures ANVOA was performed to examine the efficacy of the mood 
induction in increasing sad mood. VAS scores from pre-mood induction, immediately after mood 
induction, six minutes after mood induction, and 12 minutes after mood induction were entered 
as dependent variables and within-subjects factors; depression history (previously depressed or 
never depressed control) was entered as a between-subjects factor. Mauchly’s test indicated that 
the assumption of sphericity was violated, χ2(5) = 58.08, p < .001, and thus degrees of freedom 
were corrected using the Hunyh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε = .77). The interaction of VAS 
scores and depression history was not significant. Further, the main effect of group was not 
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significant, indicating that VAS scores did not significantly differ as a function of depression 
history. There was a significant main effect for VAS across time of administration. Contrasts 
between pre-mood induction VAS scores and VAS scores obtained immediately after mood 
induction revealed a significant increase in sad mood. Contrasts between VAS scores obtained 
immediately after mood induction and six minutes after mood induction revealed a significant 
decrease in sad mood. Sad mood significantly decreased between six and 12 minutes after mood 
induction.  Thus, sad mood increased significantly from baseline after the mood induction. Sad 
mood then decreased such that baseline sad mood was nearly restored after six minutes and fully 
restored after 12 minutes. See Figure 1 for a graphical representation of these results. 
The PANAS was also used to assess reactivity to the mood induction. Pre- and post-
mood induction scores from the Negative Affect (NA) scale of the PANAS were entered as the 
dependent variable and within-subjects factor, and group was entered as the between-subjects 
factor. The interaction of depression history and NA approached significance. There was a 
significant main effect for time, indicating that participants experienced a significant increase in 
negative affect following the mood induction. There was not a significant main effect for 
depression history, indicating that groups did not significantly differ in increase of negative 
affect after mood induction. Please see Figure 2 for a graphical representation of these results. 
Additionally, pre- and post-mood induction scores from the Positive Affect (PA) scale of 
the PANAS were examined in a repeated measures ANOVA. The interaction of depression 
history and time of administration was not significant. The mood induction significantly 
decreased positive affect. Positive affect did not differentially decrease as a function of 
depression history. Please see Figure 3 for a graphical representation of these results. Further, 
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please see Table 2 for a summary of mood induction results and Table 3 for a summary of VAS 
and PANAS means. 
Mood Reactivity and Recovery 
 Similar to Clasen et al. (2012), three mood variables were created to represent reactivity 
to and recovery from the mood induction. Subtracting the baseline VAS score from the time two 
VAS score measured reactivity, with larger, positive difference scores denoting greater mood 
reactivity. Two mood recovery variables were created to represent the recovery from mood 
induction at six minutes after mood induction and 12 minutes after mood induction. Subtracting 
the time two VAS score from the time three and time four VAS scores, respectively, created 
these variables. For these recovery variables, increasingly negative values denote greater mood 
recovery (e.g., VAS2 = 70; recovery1 = 30-70 = -40; recovery2 = 10-70 = -60). A summary of 
mood reactivity and recovery after six and 12 minutes is provided in Table 4.  
 Mood reactivity, F(1, 82) = 0.33, p = .57, recovery after six minutes, F(1, 82) = 0.47, p = 
.49, and recovery after 12 minutes, F(1, 82) = 0.84, p = .36, did not significantly differ as a 
function of depression history, indicating that groups reacted and recovered similarly to the 
mood induction. A significant negative correlation was found between mood reactivity and mood 
recovery after six minutes, r = -0.62, p  < .001. Similarly, a significant negative correlation was 
found between mood reactivity and mood recovery after 12 minutes, r = -0.72, p < .001. Thus, 
larger increases in reported sad mood were associated with larger decreases in sad mood after six 
minutes and 12 minutes. Mood recovery after six minutes and mood recovery after 12 minutes 
were significantly positively correlated, r = .84, p < .001, indicating that decreases in sad mood 
after six minutes were associated with decreases in sad mood after 12 minutes.  
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 BDI-II scores significantly predicted reactivity to the mood induction, β = -.23, t(82) = -
2.13, p = .04, adjusted R2 = .041, such that lower BDI-II scores predicted higher rates of 
reactivity. BDI-II scores did not significantly predict mood recovery after six minutes, or mood 
recovery after 12 minutes. 
Attentional Bias  
 A quantitative attentional bias score for each participant was derived from observed 
reaction times. Mogg, Holmes, Garner, and Bradley (2008) suggested the following formula as a 
measure of general attentional bias derived from the exogenous cuing task:  
attentional bias score =  (mean RT invalid emotion cue – mean RT valid emotion cue)- 
 (mean RT invalid neutral cue – mean RT valid neutral cue)  
Emotion cues are happy or sad faces, and neutral cues are neutral faces. Attentional bias scores 
were calculated separately for happy and sad cues. Positive difference values denote a bias for 
emotional cues relative to neutral cues, whereas negative difference values denote a bias for 
neutral cues relative to emotional cues. Median was substituted for mean in this study, as median 
is also a measure of central tendency. 
Incorrect responses to task trials were not included analyses. Omitting incorrect responses 
resulted in excluding 1.87% of raw RT data. Median RTs were calculated for each trial type 
(e.g., invalid sad, valid sad) and session number (one, two, or three) for each participant. Median 
was selected instead of mean based on individual differences in skew and distribution of trial 
type. Median best captured individual differences without eliminating outliers. A summary of 
attentional bias scores is provided in Table 5. It is important to note that the large standard 
deviations in attentional bias scores found in the present study are congruent with those reported 
in other studies (e.g., Clasen et al., 2012).   
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Bias for sad stimuli. A repeated measures ANOVA with attentional bias administration 
time as the dependent variable and within-subjects factor, and depression history as the between-
subjects factor did not reveal a significant interaction of depression history and attentional bias 
scores for sad faces or for main effects for time of administration and depression history. Please 
see Figure 4. 
Bias for happy stimuli. A repeated measures ANOVA with attentional bias score 
administration time as the dependent variable and within-subjects factor, and depression history 
as the between-subjects factor showed a nonsignificant interaction of depression history and 
attentional bias scores for happy faces. The main effects for time of administration and 
depression history were also not significant. Please see Figure 5.  
Mood reactivity as a moderator. The relationship between attentional bias for sad and 
happy faces, mood reactivity, and depression history was examined. Because attentional bias 
scores did not significantly differ as a function of time, attentional bias from the first 
administration were used in all of the following analyses.  
Bias for sad faces. The three-way interaction for depression history, attentional bias for 
sad faces, and mood reactivity was not significant in predicting mood recovery after six minutes, 
or after 12 minutes. The two-way interaction of mood reactivity and attentional bias towards sad 
faces did not significantly predict mood reactivity after six minutes or 12 minutes.  
Bias for happy faces. The three-way interaction for depression history, attentional bias 
towards happy faces, and mood reactivity did not significantly predict recovery after six minutes, 
or 12 minutes. The two-way interaction for attentional bias for happy faces and mood reactivity 
did not significantly predict mood recovery after six minutes or 12 minutes. 
Emotion Regulation 
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 The use of each emotion regulation strategy was examined as a function of depression 
history. Use of cognitive reappraisal and executive suppression did not significantly differ as a 
function of depression history. Level of overall rumination as assessed by the RRS differentially 
varied as a function of depression history, F(1, 82) = 9.09, p = .003, η2P = .10. The differential 
employment of ruminative brooding approached significance, F(1, 82) = 2.89, p = .093, such that 
those with a history of depression reported higher levels of ruminative brooding. Use of 
reflection significantly varied as a function of depression history, F(1, 82) = 6.19,  p = .015, η2P 
= .07, and those with a history of depression reported greater levels of reflection than never 
depressed controls. Again, participants with a history of depression reported greater levels of 
overall rumination than previously depressed controls. Means of emotion regulation by 
depression history are presented in Table 6.  
 Emotion regulation as a mediator. As previously reported, bias for sad faces did not 
significantly differ as an effect of mood induction or time of administration. Similarly, bias for 
happy faces did not significantly differ as a result of time or mood induction. Since attentional 
bias scores did not significantly differ as a function of time, mood induction, and group, 
attentional bias scores from the first administration were used in mediation analysis.  
 In order to examine whether mediation has occurred, three relationships must be 
established: (1) the independent variable predicts the mediator; (2) the independent variable 
predicts the dependent variable; and (3) the mediating variable predicts the dependent variable 
(Baron & Kenney, 1986). The second relationship was first examined, as it was present in all 
mediation models. Regarding the second relationship, bias for happy faces did not significantly 
predict recovery after six minutes or after 12 minutes. Further, bias for sad faces did not 
significantly predict mood recovery after six minutes or after 12 minutes. Thus, mediation 
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models could not be tested because the relationships between attentional bias and sustained 
negative affect (recovery after six and 12 minutes) were not significant.   
 Emotion regulation processes and mood reactivity and recovery. The relationship 
between each emotion regulation strategy and reactivity to the mood induction was assessed. 
Overall rumination, ruminative brooding, reflection, and executive suppression did not 
significantly predict mood recovery. However, cognitive reappraisal significantly predicted 
mood reactivity, β = .27, t(82) = -2.50, p = .015, adjusted R2 = .059. Thus, those who endorsed 
greater levels of cognitive reappraisal experienced greater reactivity to the mood induction. The 
relationship between each emotion regulation strategy and mood recovery at six minutes and 12 
minutes after mood induction was also assessed. Ruminative brooding, or simply brooding, did 
not significantly predict mood recovery after six minutes or12 minutes. Reflection also did not 
significantly predict mood recovery after 6 minutes or after 12 minutes. The overall rumination 
score derived by the RRS did not significantly predict mood recovery after six minutes or after 
12 minutes. Use of cognitive reappraisal did not significantly predict mood recovery after six 
minutes; however, cognitive reappraisal did significantly predict mood recovery after 12 
minutes, such that those with higher reported levels of reappraisal had negative, and therefore 
greater, recovery after 12 minutes. Use of executive suppression approached significance in 
predicted mood recovery after six minutes, but did not significantly predict recovery after 12 
minutes. Please see Table 7 for a summary of these results.  
 Emotion regulation processes and BDI-II scores. The association between BDI-II 
scores and emotion regulation processes were examined. The correlation between BDI-II scores 
and overall rumination, reflection, ruminative brooding, and cognitive reappraisal were not 
significant. However, the correlation between BDI-II scores and executive suppression was 
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significant, r (82)= .219, p = .023, suggesting that higher BDI-II scores correspond to more 
frequent use of executive suppression.  
Discussion 
This study examined the role of emotion regulation in the association between attentional 
bias for emotional faces and sustained negative affect following a mood induction in previously 
depressed and never depressed participants. Contrary to the main hypothesis, none of the 
examined emotion regulation processes mediated the relationship between attentional bias 
towards sad faces and sustained negative affect. Further, incongruent with cognitive theories and 
previous research (Joorman & Gotlib, 2007; Sears et al., 2011), the present study did not find 
significant differences in attentional bias scores as a function of depression history. The 
relationship between emotion regulation processes and sustained negative affect, operationalized 
as mood recovery in the present study, was examined. Contrary to emotion regulation theory, 
ruminative brooding, reflection, and overall rumination did not significantly predict mood 
recovery. However, in line with theory, cognitive reappraisal significantly predicted mood 
recovery after 12 minutes, such that those with higher reported levels of reappraisal experienced 
greater mood recovery. Interestingly, higher levels of cognitive reappraisal coincided with 
greater reactivity to the mood induction. Consistent with emotion regulation theory and research 
that executive suppression only temporarily reduces negative emotionality (Gross 1998, 2001), 
use of suppression approached significance in predicting mood recovery after six minutes, such 
that those with higher reported levels of suppression experienced less mood recovery.  
Regarding differences in use of emotion regulation processes between previously 
depressed and never depressed individuals, reported use of ruminative brooding, reflection, and 
overall rumination significantly differed as a function of depression history, such that previously 
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depressed individuals reported higher levels of these variables. Contrary to previous findings 
(e.g., Aldao et al., 2009), there were no differences in reported use of executive suppression 
between groups; however, use of executive suppression increased as BDI-II scores increased, in 
line with research that suggests suppression is associated with increased risk of depression 
(Aldao et al., 2009). Reported frequency of use of cognitive reappraisal did not significantly 
differ as a function of depression history, which is congruent with findings that previously 
depressed and never depressed individuals use cognitive reappraisal more frequently than do 
currently depressed individuals (e.g., Joorman & Gotlib, 2010).  
There are several potential reasons why emotion regulation did not mediate the 
relationship between attentional bias and sustained negative affect. Perhaps the short duration of 
the experiment in a lab did not permit enough time to assess the effects of emotion regulation on 
sustained negative affect. In particular, previous literature and research has posited that use of 
executive suppression promotes temporary relief from negative emotionality, but that it also 
predicts negative emotionality later. Thus, mood could be sampled hours or days in a short-term 
longitudinal fashion after such an experiment to better capture the effects of some emotion 
regulation processes. Additionally, while the emotion regulation constructs examined in the 
present study have theoretical and empirical support for affecting mood, other constructs beyond 
those examined might be explored. Several emotion regulation processes and coping styles have 
been identified, including acceptance, mindfulness-based emotion regulation, behavioral and 
experiential avoidance, and emotion-focused and problem-focused coping (Folkman & Lazarus, 
1980; Folkman & Lazarus, 1986). Further, different personality dimensions, such as trait 
neuroticism and extroversion, have been linked to differential use of emotion regulation 
processes (Wang, Shi, & Li, 2009). Thus, factors such as trait neuroticism and extraversion may 
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explain the relationship between attentional bias and negative affect. The respective relationships 
between neuroticism and negative affect and extraversion and positive affect have been well 
established in the literature (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1980), and experimental manipulation of 
neuroticism and extraversion increase negative and positive affect, respectively (McNiel & 
Fleeson, 2006). Thus, an examination of trait neuroticism and extraversion and their 
corresponding coping and emotion regulation processes and their relationships to attentional 
biases and sustained negative affect could be a worthwhile endeavor.  
Another important issue that may have contributed to the nonsignficant findings is the 
mood induction procedure. In the present study, participants were asked to think about a negative 
event in their life while they listened to sad music. After the music ended, they were asked to 
write about the event they had thought about. Research suggests that writing about a negative 
event may paradoxically result in increases in positive affect, depending on the individual’s 
coping style and the nature of the event (Baker & Berenbaum, 2007). Thus, instructing 
participants to write about the negative event may have inadvertently counteracted the negative 
mood state caused by thinking about a negative event while listening to sad music. Indeed, while 
the mood induction produced a significant increase in sad mood, participants went from a mean 
VAS score of 20.18 to 42.08 before and after the mood induction, respectively. The VAS is a 
100mm line with zero corresponding to no sadness, 50 corresponding to moderate sadness, and 
100 corresponding to extreme sadness. Thus, in the present study, the average participant felt 
slightly sad before mood induction and slightly less than moderately sad after mood induction. 
The effects of the induction dissipated quickly after the induction, as mean VAS scores were 
28.13 and 22.40, after six and 12 minutes, respectively. Further, while negative affect as assessed 
by the PANAS significantly increased, mean negative affect before and after mood induction 
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remained in the normative range established by Crawford and Henry (2004; M = 16.00 SD = 
5.90). Positive affect significantly decreased after mood induction, and positive affect scores 
after the mood induction fell one standard deviation below the normative range for positive 
affect; however, the mean baseline positive affect score was slightly below Crawford and 
Henry’s norms but still within the average range. The positive affect scale of the PANAS 
corresponds to degree of pleasurable engagement in the environment. Thus, significant decreases 
suggest a decrease in pleasurable feelings, but not an increase in sad mood. Overall, the mood 
induction produced a brief, short-lived effect that may have contributed to the null findings. 
One important limitation of this study is that a brief assessment of attentional bias was 
used at three different time points in an effort to prevent participant fatigue and diminish practice 
effects. However, the small number of trials used in the present study could have impacted 
reliability of the generated attentional bias scores and may have contributed to nonsignificant 
findings. In addition, because mood induction did not have a significant effect on attentional 
bias, separate sessions should be collapsed into one session. Thus, a single session with a greater 
number of trials could be employed in future research. Additionally, more accurate means of 
assessing attentional bias, such as eye-tracking technology, could be used in place of RT 
assessment.  
In sum, emotion regulation did not mediate the relationship between attentional bias and 
negative affect. Further, contrary to previous findings and cognitive theories, no differences were 
found in attentional biases between previously depressed and never depressed individuals and 
how they reacted to a mood induction, and attentional bias did not predict sustained negative 
affect. However, some differences in how emotions are regulated emerged and were somewhat 
consistent with previous research. The results of the present study suggest that cognitive 
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reappraisal may be particularly important in reducing sustained negative affect. Future work 
might sample mood a few hours or days after mood induction to better capture the effects of 
some emotion regulation processes, such as executive suppression. Future studies could employ 
lengthier cognitive tasks without repetition to assess attentional bias and more precise measures, 
such as eye-tracking, could be utilized in place of RT assessment. Additionally, future studies 
could examine the extent to which personality variables, coping strategies, and emotion 
regulation strategies beyond those examined in the present study may influence the association 
between attentional bias and sustained negative affect in depression. Uncovering factors that 
cultivate and perpetuate sustained negative affect is important not only for the prevention and 
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Table 1 
Sample Characteristics 
Characteristic Control PD Statistic 
Mean age (years; SD) 19.20 (2.20) 19.07 (1.44) t(82) = ns 
Mean BDI-II Score (SD) 4.82 (2.61) 5.00 (2.65) t(82) = ns 
Mean depression length 
(weeks) 
 12.02 (1.87)  
Gender, n   χ2 (1) = ns 
   Female 27 30  
   Male 17 10  
Race, n   Fisher’s exact test = ns 
   White 35 33  
   African American 2 0  
   Asian 1 2  
   Hispanic 4 2  
   American Indian 0 0  
   Other 2 3  
Income, n   Fisher’s exact test = ns 
   Under $15,000 7 5  
   $15,000 – 50,000 9 5  
   $50,000 – 100,000 7 14  
   $100,000 – 200,000 15 11  
   Over $200,000 6 5  
Year in school, n   Fisher’s exact test = ns 
   Freshman 29 26  
   Sophomore 8 10  
   Junior 3 1  
   Senior  8 10  
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Table 2 
Mood Induction Results, by measure 
Measure Statistic 
VAS  
   Main effect of time F(2.32, 82) = 67.70, p < .001, η2P =.45 
   Contrast of VAS1 and VAS2 F(1, 82) = 112.02, p < .001, η2P = .58 
   Contrast of VAS2 and VAS3 F(1, 82) = 91.89,  p < .001,  η2P = .53 
   Contrast of VAS3 and VAS4 F(1, 82) = 23.99, p < .001, η2P = .23 
NA  
   Main effect of depression history F(1, 82) = 3.351, p = .07 
   Main effect of time F(1, 82) = 21.90, p < .001, η2P = .21 
PA  




VAS and PANAS Means 
Measure Time 1d Time 2e Time 3f Time 4g 
Mean VASa score 
(SD) 
20.18 (20.33) 42.08 (22.74) 28.13 (19.50) 22.40 (19.04) 
Mean NAb score 
(SD) 
14.67 (4.89) 16.73 (4.96) - - 
Mean PAc score 
(SD) 
28.25 (7.86) 22.92 (9.23) - - 
Notes: aVAS is the Visual Analog Scale. bNA is the Negative Affect Scale of the PANAS. cPA is the Positive Affect 
Scale of the PANAS. dTime 1 occurred immediately before the mood induction. eTime 2 occurred immediately after 





Mood Reactivity and Recovery Scores, by depression history 
  Control   PD  
 Mean  
(SD) 
Median Range Mean  
(SD) 
Median Range 
Reactivity 20.77 (19.30) 18.00 (-13, 63) 23.15 (18.66) 17.00 (-3, 62) 
Recovery1a  -13.00 (12.45) -12.50 (-44, 9) -15.00 (14.32) -17.50 (-38, 9) 
Recovery 2b -17.86 (18.45) -13.50 (-68, 17) -21.67 (19.68) -18.50 (-62, 13) 
Notes: aRecovery1 denotes mood recovery six minutes after mood induction. bRecovery 2 denotes mood recovery 12 




Attentional Bias Scores (Sad, Happy), by depression history 
  Control  PD 
Valence, Trial  Mean (SD) Median Range Mean (SD) Median Range 
Sad (ms), 1  2.40 (61.48) 0.75 (-185, 142.5)  13.79 (45.98) 21.00 (-81, 100) 
Happy (ms), 1  5.84 (60.74) 4.75 (-192.5, 135)  7.12 (51.07) 6.75 (-118, 150.5) 
Sad (ms), 2  8.28 (68.21) 4.25 (-93.5, 268)  10.05 (52.51) 8.75 (-93, 194) 
Happy (ms), 2  .81 (50.03) 1.75 (-156, 105)  8.84 (68.44) 10.00 (-94, 256) 
Sad (ms), 3  -7.90 (56.84) -6.75 (-165, 123)  1.83 (58.88) 5 (-153.5, 151) 
Happy (ms), 3  -12.75 (48.07) -14.5 (-110.5, 89)  12.92 (59.70) 14 (-106, 158) 
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Table 6 
Emotion Regulation Means, by depression history 
 Control PD 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Overall ruminationa 43.68 (10.66) 50.68 (10.58) 
Ruminative brooding 10.55 (2.61) 11.68 (3.46) 
Reflection 9.84 (3.54) 11.63 (2.97) 
Cognitive reappraisal 31.02 (6.71) 30.83 (5.95) 
Executive suppression 14.16 (5.36) 14.60 (4.61) 




Prediction of Mood Recovery, by emotion regulation process 
Process Six minutesa 12 minutesb 
Overall ruminationc β = -0.078, t(82) = -0.71, p = .48 β = -0.13, t(82) = -1.18, p = .24 
Ruminative brooding β = -0.31, t(82) = -0.65, p = .52 β = -0.54, t(82) = -0.79, p = .43 
Reflection β = 0.00, t(82) = 0.001, p = 1.00 β = -0.091, t(82) = -0.83, p = .41 
Cognitive reappraisal β = -0.10, t (82) = -0.93, p = .36 β = -0.28, t(82) = -2.61, p = .011 
Executive suppression β = 0.18, t(82) = 1.67, p = .099 β = 0.13, t(82) = 1.15, p = .25 
Notes: aSix minutes denotes mood recovery observed six minutes after mood induction. bTwelve minutes denotes 
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Figure 1 
Mean VAS Scores, as a function of time 
 
 
Notes: VAS1 denotes VAS score before mood induction. VAS2 denotes VAS score immediately 
after mood induction. VAS3 denotes VAS score six minutes after mood induction, and VAS4 
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Figure 2 
Mean NA Scores, as a function of time 
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Figure 3 



















   





















   




Mean Attentional Bias Scores for Happy Faces, by depression history 
 
 
 
